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 RISK PERCEPTION AND MANAGEMENT IN DEVELOPMENT PHILANTHROPY 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The elimination of poverty is the No1 goal outlined in the United Nation’s sustainable 
development agenda 2030 (United Nations 2016). It is also the focus of numerous NGOs and 
charities, as well as development assistance programs from governments (Pratt et al 2006). In its 
broadest sense, poverty is defined as a failure of basic human capability to function in society 
(Nussbaum and Sen, 1993). It could be caused by a complex array of problems such as 
“inadequate income or education, poor health, insecurity, low self-confidence, a sense of 
powerlessness or the absence of rights such as freedom of speech” (World Bank Institute, 2005).  
 
In this paper, we use the phrase international development to describe any effort that is exerted to 
grow human capability to function in society. Economic growth, although an important factor in 
eliminating poverty, does not address poverty elimination in this broader sense (Dollar, et al, 
2013; Dollar and Kraay, 2002).  This paper focuses on unblocking a key barrier that prevents 
many countries from alleviating poverty, namely a “lack of innovation” in the systems that foster 
human wellbeing (Sachs, 2005). We chose this focus because of its importance. In a  study 
spanning two decades which examined differences in attained poverty reduction Sachs (2005, 
p62) concluded that “the innovation gap is certainly one of the most fundamental reasons why … 
Revised Manuscript (track changes accepted)
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 2 
countries have diverged and why the poorest of the poor have not been able to get a foothold on 
growth.”   
 
So how might one foster that innovation? One of the major conclusions of a Rockefeller 
Foundation summit held in Bellagio in Nov 2011, on The Future of Philanthropy and 
Development in the Pursuit of Human Wellbeing, was that the perception and management of 
risk in the development “system” may be an issue. While there are obviously many relevant 
development actors, participants felt that individual philanthropists (in particular), could be more 
accepting of failure and recognize that to achieve genuine change much of their resource may be 
“wasted” along the way. Failure, participants argued, should be seen as the acceptable cost of 
innovation (Bellagio Initiative, 2012). 
 
However, there is evidence that many philanthropists are not willing to take risks with their 
philanthropy. The Bank of America and Center on Philanthropy (2012) study tells us that 
virtually no high value philanthropists want to take substantive risks with their philanthropic 
assets (a mere 2.3%). Equally, a previous iteration of the same study tells us that philanthropists 
are actually more risk averse with their philanthropic assets than they are with their personal 
financial assets. Some 26% reported not being willing to take any risks with their philanthropic 
assets, compared with only 10% who took a similar view of their other financial investments 
(Bank of America and Center on Philanthropy, 2010). There is also much anecdotal evidence 
that supports these findings with many sector leaders suggesting that large scale development 
philanthropy has failed and that a greater degree of vision and risk taking is now necessary 
(National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy 2010). Howard Buffet, for example, has 
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called on his peers to take more risks and focus on longer-term solutions, although recognizing 
that not all organizations are equally well placed to do so. In his view “a private family 
foundation is in the best position of anyone to take risks. (They) don’t have to worry about 
making donors happy. (They) don’t have to fund raise,” (cited in Forbes, 2013). 
 
In the study that follows we take no stance on whether individual philanthropists should take 
more risk in their philanthropy per se. Nor do we mean to suggest that encouraging 
philanthropists to take risk is necessarily preferable to risk taking by other actors. Rather we seek 
to understand how individual philanthropists conceptualize and manage risk in their giving with 
the goal of delineating how individuals could engage in more informed decision making and 
arrive at a perspective and an approach that is right for them. 
 
To do this we use a Decoding-the-Discipline approach (Pace and Middledorf, 2004) to reach 
greater clarity on how risk is defined by development philanthropists, the perceived barriers they 
need to overcome in order to anticipate and manage such risks, and how they might be able to 
optimize the value delivered by their risk management practice. We will conclude with further 
insights on how the development sector might help promote and support higher risk-taking in 
individual philanthropy and the circumstances where that might be appropriate. 
 
 
Methodology 
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We chose to use the Decoding-the-Discipline interview procedures (Middendorf & Pace, 2004) 
guided by the principles of grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) in this research for 
important pragmatic and epistemological reasons. Pragmatically, our literature review did not 
identify any research on how risk is defined or managed by high value philanthropists. We define 
high value philanthropists as those who have given over $5 million in personal resources to the 
task of (in this case) international development. 
 
While much has been written on the topic of risk in the discipline of psychology (e.g. Slovic 
2010) and business risk management (e.g. Shapira, 1995), surprisingly little research exists on 
how entrepreneurs (with the exception of Koellinger, et al 2007; Kumar, 2013) or social 
entrepreneurs (with the exception of Ellis et al., 2012; Miles et al., 2013; Phillips, 2005) perceive 
or manage risks. The Bank of America and Center on Philanthropy study (2010, 2012) focused 
only on financial risks relying on its common definition, without asking how philanthropists 
define the concept of risk. We thus opted for a “purist” approach in the application of grounded 
theory (Dunne, 2011). That is we did not then conduct an extensive search of the literature on the 
psychology and general management of risk prior to data collection.  
 
Both authors are however aware of the existence of this literature, making it impossible, 
phenomenologically or hermeneutically, “not bring any a priori knowledge” on risk into the 
project (Locke, 1996, p. 242). In that sense, we adopted recursive analytic operations (Locke 
1996) in our application of grounded theory. That is our data collection, analysis and 
interpretations occurred in a recursive cycle where data collection and data analysis occurred 
simultaneously (i.e. constant comparison) and where decisions about which data should be 
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collected next were determined by the theory that was being constructed (i.e. theoretical 
sampling) (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1992; Dunne, 2011). The nature of this 
epistemological approach is important. It means we then permit data to dictate the development 
of our substantive theory (i.e. on risk in international development philanthropy), while at the 
same time we allow existing theoretical concepts (i.e. general psychology and management of 
risk) to earn their way into our “narrative” (Dunne, 2011). In this sense existing theory is 
analyzed as an additional informant and we treat it as such below by presenting extant thinking 
alongside our data (Glaser, 1978).   
We conducted a series of twenty 60-90 minute telephone interviews with high value 
philanthropists drawn from Africa, Asia, Europe and North/South America. Initial participants 
were recommended for their expertise in managing philanthropic risk by the funders of the study 
(the Rockefeller Foundation and the Resource Alliance). Additional informants were sought as 
the project unfolded. Each philanthropist had devoted personal wealth in excess of $5million to 
the task of international development. The sample comprised a mix of different ages (40-80) and 
genders (10 male and 10 female). It also includes individuals with first, second or third 
generation wealth. Some of them made their own wealth, while others inherited it.   
In structuring the interviews a Decoding-the Discipline (DtD) approach was adopted. Althaus 
(2005) argued that research on risk could benefit from a “disciplinary perspective.” DtD is a 
pedagogical research tool originally designed to help instructors aid students overcome 
“bottlenecks” in order to think like a disciplinary expert (Middendorf & Pace, 2004). The DtD 
approach assumes that people, who are experts in their field, become experts because they are 
extremely good at what they do. One consequence of being extremely good, however, is that the 
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thinking process that they use to become an expert becomes so natural to them that they rarely 
need to think about how they do things or reflect on the major barriers that they need to 
overcome in order accomplish something. It becomes second nature to them, making it difficult 
to isolate learning that might aid others to cope in similar scenarios. DtD is thus suited to 
scenarios where it is necessary to uncover or decode expert ways of thinking that are not 
intuitively obvious, even to the informant.  
In this approach, the interviewer focuses on barriers or “bottlenecks” that experts need to 
overcome in order to achieve a goal. We therefore asked our interviewees to “recall an 
experience where they deliberately took a higher than normal level of risk or where they had to 
cope with a difficult consequence of having taken a risky decision.” Then, the interview focused 
on teasing out the steps that such individuals go through in taking these decisions. Following 
Glaser (2001) interviews continued to the point where no new learning was accruing. At this 
point a concept has been theoretically saturated. There are differing perspectives on the 
minimum number of interviews that might be deemed sufficient for this saturation to occur (e.g. 
Bruce 2007; Guest et al 2006) but we allowed the final size of the sample to be dictated by our 
data.  
 
 
Results 
 
In the course of our interviews we delineated five barriers that our informants needed to 
overcome in order to clearly define what risk means and how to manage it, such that they may 
take the “right” kind and the “right” severity of risks in order to create impact in caring for their 
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beneficiaries. The DtD approach dictates that we took people back to the experience where they 
experienced the most difficulty or highest level of arousal in managing their risks and then traced 
the progression of their experience chronologically. It is hence possible that the seemingly 
logical steps that we identified in this paper are due in part to the method of posing 
chronologically sequenced questions.  
 
Throughout our discussion and in the discussion of the fifth barrier in particular, we will describe 
the iterative and integrated nature of how our interviewees overcame these barriers. We will 
conclude with a brief summary of how these findings can be used to design interventions to 
support risk optimization in individual philanthropy. 
 
Barrier 1: Defining What Risk Means  
 
The primary risk in international development philanthropy was felt to be the risk of not 
achieving the desired impact for the focal beneficiary group. This is what we shall refer to 
hereafter as Impact Risk. It is composed by both a sense of ambiguity and a sense of uncertainty 
(Einhorn & Hogarth, 1985). It is important to understand that this definition implies that the 
articulation of impact risk is subjective and personal to a philanthropist. This is consistent with 
previous conceptualizations (e.g. Slovic, 2010) but our research describes more precisely the 
nature of how international development philanthropists subjectively define their risks.   
 
First, it is often difficult for philanthropists to articulate how they define impact (thus creating 
uncertainty) and in many cases their definitions morphed substantively as they learned more 
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about what was necessary in a given context. One of our philanthropists, for example, originally 
defined her impact as managing the pain of terminally ill children in the focal community. This 
later morphed into successfully caring for the parents, family and community who suffer 
alongside the children, and then ultimately to transforming the education of medical doctors in 
the country such that palliative care could become a routinely considered option.  
 
Second, it is often difficult for philanthropists to decide a priori how to design an effective social 
innovation system (i.e. selection of appropriate intervention(s) and the design of an appropriate 
system for delivery) to achieve the desired impact (Liedtka & Ogilvie, 2010). This design too 
might need to morph as the program proceeds, often creating further and frequently, heightened 
uncertainty. This is what we term Operational Risk. High operational risk in international 
development philanthropy is caused primarily by the degree of innovation in the design of the 
intervention itself. Consistent with previous literature, the more philanthropists rely on pre-tested 
ideas and avenues commonly agreed to be effective, the lower the perceived risk (Murrey, 2010). 
 
Returning to our previous example, in seeking to reduce the pain experienced by terminally ill 
children our philanthropist perceived relatively little operational risk when the impact she 
conceptualized was merely the provision of palliative medicines (a simple matter of distribution). 
This morphed over time into finding innovative ways to influence the established perspective on 
medical ethics in the country where resulting to palliative care was regarded as an admission of 
failure and therefore rarely offered. 
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Finally, the lack of evidence or the provision of tangential or partial evidence in support of the 
success of an initiative can also create a source of risk. This includes the selection of relevant 
metrics, the data gathered and their interpretation. This is what we term Assessment Risk and 
the construction of the right assessment approach may also need to morph as the program 
proceeds. Assessment is where most nonprofit risk literature focuses (Paarlberg & Meinhold, 
2012; Thomson, 2010), however, most of this extant work focuses on the reporting of established 
organizations (rather than start-ups) and fails to address the relationship with the other categories 
of risk we delineate (Lee et al., 2010).  
 
Our philanthropist was initially very confident that she knew what to measure and how to 
measure it (i.e. counting the number of children aided.) “When we started out, I was running it 
like an investment bank. There were targets to be met, and the targets were basically 
established by me.” As the project progressed the identification of appropriate metrics became 
increasingly problematic. It transpired that the medical profession was highly resistant to change 
and that the only way to influence the profession was through the opinions and actions of the 
nurses caring for the patients and their families. As the nature of the intervention morphed, so the 
search for appropriate assessment measures morphed and this in turn (ultimately) helped shape 
her conceptualization of her impact risk.  
 
Considered together (see Table 1) our research therefore reveals a complicated picture of how 
international development philanthropists define risks: three discrete categories of risk, but with 
the ambiguity and uncertainty in each capable of generating further ambiguity and uncertainty in 
others (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1985).  
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Insert Table 1 near here. 
 
Other risks concerning philanthropists engaged in international development include financial 
risks, reputational risks, political risks and personal risks. These other risks however were never 
described as the “core,” “fundamental,” or “most important,” risks that troubled them. In the 
majority of our cases, these other types of risks concerned philanthropists because they increased 
their impact or operational risk. The reduction of these other risks was never mentioned as an 
end in itself. Our cases did not contain reference to any other risks.  
 
Barrier 2: Determining What Degree of Risk is Acceptable  
 
Slovic (2000, pxxxvi) concluded after 50 years of research on risk perception that "there is no 
such thing as … objective risk." "Risk (similar to organizational effectiveness) is inherently 
subjective" and a function of many different variables, notably the background, personality and 
experiences of the individual (eg Sung & Hanna, 1996; Grable & Lytton, 1998).  
 
People also take decisions in part about the risk they are prepared to tolerate by drawing on other 
life experiences, even if these are drawn from other contexts where the circumstances and rules 
of the game are very different. They also tend to over-emphasize conclusions drawn from recent 
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experiences (Zackay, 1984) and place more emphasis on the consequences of decision outcomes 
than on their statistical probabilities (Forlani, 2002).  
 
One widely studied decision making heuristic appears to influence most aspects of how 
philanthropists assess risk. The heuristic we are referring to is termed anchoring. Kahneman and 
Tversky (1974) found that people often make numerical judgments by anchoring on a number 
and then adjusting for other things that they know. But on average, people under-adjust. In 
philanthropy what was identified in our study, was that this heuristic can be helpful or harmful to 
risk assessment depending on the nature of such anchors, the specific context of the 
philanthropic decision making and the extent to which the individual appropriately adjusts. From 
our discussions, for example, it was clear that many of our participants had used anchors drawn 
from their experience in business and the public sector and thus, as it turned out (Epley & 
Gilovich, 2005), anchors that were inappropriate to the practice of philanthropy.  
 
So how does this happen? The first task that philanthropists appeared to face when making 
decisions about how much risk to take in a given philanthropic engagement was to determine the 
magnitude of both impact and to a lesser extent financial risks. In respect of impact risks, our 
philanthropists tended to term the following types of projects high-risk projects; circumstances 
where: 
 
a) Outcomes are hard to measure 
b) Accurate measurements are hard to obtain 
c) Positive measurements may only show up in a long-term time horizon. 
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d) Outcome measures are not endorsed homogeneously by all relevant parties. 
 
In respect of financial risk they consider the following factors in determining the level of risk: 
 
a) How risk-diverse is their philanthropic portfolio 
b) Where does a particular philanthropic investment lie in their philanthropic profile 
c) How big is a particular philanthropic investment? 
 
There are echoes of these points in the wider business risk and judgment and decision making 
literature where it is well established that the more ambiguous the probability of success is, the 
less likely one is to perceive such endeavors as risky, the more risk-diversified one’s portfolio is, 
the more likely one is to tolerate risk and the larger a particular investment is, the higher the risk 
it is perceived to carry (Slovic, 2000). Our research identifies that these are the critical factors in 
the domain of philanthropy. 
 
We also gain new insight through combining knowledge of anchoring and under-adjustment with 
context specific knowledge about how philanthropists define impact and operational risk. We 
can thus begin to answer questions such as how “hard” is hard, how “long” is long, how 
“diverse” is comfortably diverse, and how “big” is too big?  
 
We found that philanthropists use their own previous experience to anchor their judgment about 
philanthropic risks, and they do so along the dimensions we mention above. For example, for 
someone who has been engaged in the world of venture capital in medical research, they will be 
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used to making large investments over significant time horizons where the outcomes may not be 
known for many years and where the side effects of any new drugs may be hard to quantify. The 
likely outcomes from their philanthropy may be similarly hard to quantify, and they thus see the 
impact risk as moderate, but if the size of the investment is significantly smaller and the time 
horizon shorter than they are used to, they will be inclined to see less financial risk in their 
giving. 
 
What this means is that they weight their risk assessment more heavily on their past experience 
than they should and take less account of the “real” risk in the context of their philanthropic 
decisions. For example, for a Venture Capital professional, when he decides to become a 
philanthropist, he may engage in “unnecessarily” high risk philanthropy, simply because he is 
used to high risk, while an industrialist may engage in “unnecessarily” low risk philanthropy, 
because she is not comfortable with higher degrees of risk. From this perspective, past 
professional experience might become a foe not a friend in determining the optimal risk to take 
in their philanthropy (see also Zackay, 1984). 
 
To encourage individuals to improve their philanthropic decision making they have to be 
encouraged to set aside value judgements and their associated anchors from their prior 
experience (in business) and to consider philanthropic decisions afresh. Hermansson (2012), for 
example, argues that “even though every ‘objective’ risk can be described in several different 
ways, and does involve value judgements and emotions, the (search for) objectivity ideal should 
not be abandoned.” (Hermansson, 2012, p.16)  Thus if an individual wishes to become a full time 
philanthropist a process of education must take place. Individuals need to be given new anchor 
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points appropriate to the sector they will now be working in, perhaps through the establishment 
of networks that allow philanthropists and development professions to share experiences and 
communicate new norms.  
 
“All six of us (in the same giving circle) come from business and cooperate 
background and tended to apply that business logic. “Why should we be doing 
this?” And some times during the process we needed one of us to step back and 
say, “This is crazy”. We are here to give away our money… we should allow 
ourselves to take a much greater amount of risk and take a vow to give away this 
money rather than be protective….” 
 
An alternative approach would be to encourage philanthropists to engage in a greater degree of 
reflection. The goal here isn’t to change the anchor, rather to ensure that the individual adjusts 
correctly. Individuals need to be helped to realize how their (sometimes irrelevant) past 
experience influences their risk assessment in philanthropy, so they may adjust properly and 
arrive at a more mature assessment of the risk at hand. 
 
“Let’s say that their spouse or child gets cancer. Giving can be a personal 
reaction. They just don’t think any further on it. They are just giving to the cause 
because of a person or connection. And somewhere along the way they start 
asking questions about what the organization is doing and then they get a bit 
appalled (because of their business expectations). Then they might be more 
discriminating about their giving. Then when they get to my stage they start to 
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realize that each organization they are giving to is a distinct philanthropic gift as 
opposed to a commercial investment. So I think it is a learning curve that we all 
have to go through.” 
 
A third potential approach would to be help philanthropists identify projects that have a better fit 
with the levels of risk they are comfortably used to taking. Philanthropists can match themselves 
to the right causes, or the right causes can seek out the right philanthropists. The individual can 
then be encouraged to take rational small steps out of their comfort zone. The idea is presented 
graphically in Figure 1. 
 
If a philanthropist is comfortable with accurately adjusted risk assessment at level 1, in order for 
her to take up additional risk, the best way to encourage that is to find a project that is at level 2 
and move her up the scale. She would be uncomfortable and may even refuse to invest directly in 
projects perceived as level 5 yet lower levels may be acceptable. Individuals from different 
professional backgrounds will be more or less risk tolerant and thus arrive at a different level in 
the model. 
 
 
Insert Figure 1 Near Here 
 
 
Barrier 3: How to Decide When to Shift Mindset 
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Kahneman and Tversky (1979) found that when individuals are deciding whether or not to take a 
risk they are most sensitive to changes in probability near the natural boundaries of 0 
(impossible) and 1 (certain). Thus, a 0.1 increase in the probability of making a social impact has 
a greater impact on decisions when it changes the probability of making an impact from zero to 
0.1 (from impossibility to a slight chance of making an impact) or from achieving a definite 
impact to a slight chance of something going wrong (i.e. from 1.0 to 0.9). Consider the following 
philanthropic examples. In our first scenario a philanthropist believes there is a 70% chance of an 
organization achieving a social impact without their help and an 80% chance if she offers it. She 
will be much less likely to offer her support than in a second scenario where there is a 10% 
chance of success with her help and none without it.  
 
Our interviewees felt that many new philanthropists were taking decisions in the realm of 0.9 to 
1.0 where with the proper metrics they could approach certainty in respect of the outcome they 
desired to achieve. At the same time, there would also seem to be an opportunity to focus on the 
other end of the scale, where there is zero probability of achieving a social impact without a 
philanthropist’s involvement. Theory predicts that philanthropists will be as likely to engage in 
this latter scenario, so the issue for innovation projects becomes one of framing.  
 
To illustrate - one of our interviewees explained that each and every one of his program ideas 
had been tried by other organizations before and met with failure. What attracted him was the 
ability to combine these ideas and have them tackled by a single entity. In aggregate the risk was 
therefore very substantial, but he believed that a multi-faceted approach had a “slim” chance of 
working. He was in a unique position to be able to try that approach and thus create something 
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from nothing. That is what ultimately drew him to the project. Kahneman and Tversky explain 
this behavior and suggest that this philanthropist would have been less likely to invest if the 
previous interventions by other organizations had been met with mixed success. 
 
A number of our philanthropists elected to “balance” their giving by selecting some projects 
which approached certainty in their likelihood of success (and thus seen as “low hanging fruit”), 
but adding project(s) where the probability of success is close to zero, but where the potential 
gains are highly desirable. They thus adopted a portfolio perspective, consistent with general risk 
theories.  
 
Our interviews suggested a further option, namely focusing on the role of the individual 
philanthropist, rather than the project per se. There are many scenarios where the project will 
only have impact if a particular philanthropist gets involved. If a nonprofit can make it clear that 
there is a close to zero chance of the project happening without ONLY this one individual’s 
support they can increase the likelihood of giving. Our data indicated that it was not enough for 
this matching to be superficial. Many individuals might be able to offer the focal amount or share 
a genuine passion for the cause. The notion of a match only became believable when distinctive 
knowledge and competences were sought.  Figure 2 illustrates the idea. 
 
Insert Figure 2 Near Here 
 
It may be rare that a philanthropist would be willing to immerse themselves in a project and 
provide all the elements we list in the box, but it was clear from our interviews that some 
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combination of the talent they bring to the table may on occasion be distinct. What interests us 
this approach is that while such a tailored ask would be likely to increase the chances of support, 
it will also enhance the giving experience for the philanthropist (Bellagio Initiative, 2012). 
 
There are also take-outs from Kahneman and Tversky’s work for individual philanthropists who 
can benefit from being aware of how their assessments of risk are framed. They too can seek 
better matches between their philanthropy and competences to achieve impact or identify 
personal development issues that might need to be addressed to get them to that point. They can 
also be cognizant of a natural tendency towards short-term gratification (Angeletos et al., 2001) 
rather than longer-term projects that might better serve both their needs and the needs of the 
community. As the quality of the individual fit improves, they should become more accepting of 
risk.  
 
Barrier 4: Coping With Negative Emotion 
 
Many of our informants reported a high degree of frustration with their early forays into the 
domain of philanthropy. They experienced frustration if success was not as forthcoming as they 
hoped and after successive “failures” were encountered, some of those we interviewed had 
actively considered withdrawing from the domain. As one individual commented “there just 
didn’t seem to be the personal rewards I had hoped for.”  In this section we explore the source of 
that negative emotion and how reframing the issues might prove helpful. 
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In a philanthropic transaction, an amount of money is transferred from a philanthropist’s account 
direct to another’s account. There is nothing intrinsic to this transfer that is either a gain or a loss, 
so a philanthropist could view it as either. This transfer might be perceived as a gain when social 
impact is anticipated or achieved; and as a loss when an undesired social impact is created or a 
desired social impact is created unsustainably, or not at all. In this sense, the valuation of money 
is never a stand-alone valuation in the philanthropic context. The valuation of any financial input 
is always associated with the valuation of the achievement or anticipated sustainable 
achievement of the social impact. One reflected that “look, we are going to give this money 
away anyway but this is a better way of applying our philanthropic dollars. We don’t need any 
financial return but we do want to see the social and environmental return.” 
 
To encourage successful risk assessment and management, our philanthropists explicitly 
articulated what would constitute gains and losses in terms of their resources. These resources 
may include financial, time and/or network resources. An explicit consideration of these issues 
has the potential to greatly enhance decision making since the philanthropists in our sample were 
typically 1) very good at articulating potential loses or gains for their beneficiaries, but not for 
themselves and 2) very good at articulating potential losses, but not as good at articulating all the 
potential gains. 
 
In evaluating philanthropic impact, our philanthropists consciously considered social impact as a 
gain, and the nature of this gain is what concerns them most in their philanthropic involvement. 
Since this is the type of gain that they consider central to their philanthropic investment, they 
were almost always focused on refining it until when they could articulate it clearly. They 
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acknowledged that this articulation may not have been clear at the inception of a project, but it 
was nevertheless something that they had made a conscious effort to do. One of our informants 
reflected that “for me I was always very strict. “Why don’t we have the results? Why don’t they 
want high marks? Is that the right impact …?” 
 
What was less obvious to some philanthropists was that personal impact (i.e. impact on them as 
an individual) can also be a gain.  Most participants felt that personal gain was not why they 
entered philanthropy and they stopped their reflection at that point without necessarily asking 
themselves what consequence their philanthropy might bring to them. As selfish as this reflection 
might seem, our interviews revealed that those who had considered personal gains found much 
more depth and personal value in their philanthropy, typically reflecting on the meaning of their 
life as articulated through their giving, the intellectual stimulation of trying to solve difficult and 
often intractable social problems, and/or the sustained enjoyment derived from developing their 
competence to contribute to social change (consistent with recommendations of economist, 
Andreoni, 1990).  
 
“I am really good at problem solving. A lot of social problems are really difficult 
to solve, and no one has been able to solve them before. My philanthropy offers 
me the opportunity to stretch my problem-solving skills to a place where they 
have never been stretched before, and that is exciting and fun.”  
 
Indeed there is evidence in the extant literature that “successful risk taking individuals are likely 
to believe that they can beat the odds …and that they have special abilities” (West & Berthon, 
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1997, p.30). Thus being given the opportunity to reinforce that identity can be a significant 
personal gain. Here, our philanthropists actually experience “more excitement and fun” in 
solving social problems, then solving problems in their business careers such as investment 
banking. This is because for them, “the social sector is maybe more challenging … in many 
aspects than the private sector. It is no less rewarding, meaningful, fulfilling; in fact probably 
more so than working in the private sector.”  
 
As obvious as this might sound, we found that if philanthropists did not focus consciously on 
what their giving achieved for them, their potential losses can begin to outweigh their gains. As a 
consequence they can experience negative emotions and they are less likely to be accepting of 
development risk.  
 
 
 
 
Barrier 5: How to Decide What to Transfer from Their Life Experience to Their 
Philanthropy 
 
 
In comparison to the previous four barriers, this barrier would not in itself make-or-break one’s 
philanthropy. It is simply a learning journey that our interviewees consciously monitored and 
improved with time and experience. However, failing to overcome this last barrier simultaneous 
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with overcoming the others could increase the perceived severity of the first four barriers and 
harm one’s overall risk-appetite for philanthropy.  
 
Many participants in our study felt that one of the most important lessons they had learned on 
their philanthropic journey was the importance of gaining domain specific knowledge of the 
social problems they targeted and the need to gain higher competence in solving these problems. 
This higher competence could be derived from their experience in philanthropy, but it would 
more typically derive from understanding how to leverage their existing (perhaps business 
acquired) competences to tackle the social problem. That is to leverage the same general thinking 
skills but properly adjust to the right anchors in their thinking frameworks.  
 
During the initial learning stage, when the development problems are not smoothly gelled with 
their existing competence, they experience a challenge to their sense of self-efficacy and as we 
noted above can become disheartened with the reality of how difficult it is to create and sustain 
social change. For some of our participants, early in their philanthropic ‘careers’ this feeling of 
powerlessness had led to a growing desire to terminate their philanthropic involvement. Erecting 
a “reflection buffer” before transferring other life experiences to their philanthropic domain 
might therefore be valuable. 
 
One example of a transfer that may or may not be helpful is an individual’s decision making 
rules. As one informant told us “When I make a business investment, I am concerned about the 
maximization of financial returns in my investment. But when I make a philanthropic investment, 
all that I care about is that the nonprofit organization can make ends meet while achieving its 
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goals.” So in the philanthropic context they do not maximize financial returns, but instead seek 
what our informant referred to as a kind of  “break-even” point such that the cause they care 
about may be sustainable. There was broad agreement that philanthropy was different in this 
way, yet what seemed more problematic for our interviewees was unpacking the notion of what 
it meant to ‘break-even’ and thus what might constitute an appropriate level of investment and its 
associated level of risk. This struggle associated with defining operational risk is made more 
severe when one’s impact risk is not well defined, and thus no decision rules may be properly 
evaluated.  
 
Our data show that the position is further complicated by the notion that there appeared to be 
different criteria applied when asking the question “why should I invest?” from “why shouldn’t I 
invest?” One participant told us that “I worked hard to earn my income, so I do not want it to be 
wasted,” but in the course of the conversation it became apparent that the avoidance of waste 
was rarely considered as a key criteria for saying yes to a project. Rather this appeared to be a 
major criterion in saying no. This was a theme repeated consistently in our interviews; 
philanthropists seemed to have two distinct sets of criteria. This dichotomy matters for two 
reasons; firstly that Kahneman and Tversky (1979) tell us that philanthropists will pay a 
disproportionate amount of attention to the negative list and secondly, the negative list is often 
comprised of factors associated with a high degree of ambiguity e.g. what constitutes “waste”? 
 
The judgment about what constitutes “waste” may again be determined through the principle of 
anchoring, but the difficulty for those new to philanthropy is that they frequently have nothing to 
anchor to as nonprofits operate in a different way to either businesses or the public sector. 
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Administration costs, for example, were frequently mentioned as a cause for concern, yet 
administration in the nonprofit context is inherently more complex than in business, making it 
inappropriate to anchor to that context (Murray, 2010). 
 
Individuals new to philanthropy are thus ill placed to take decisions on what constitutes 
management “waste” or “inefficiency” as their business or public sector anchors no longer apply. 
We therefore recommend that philanthropists be encouraged to consciously reflect on what they 
are anchoring against and the hidden incompatibilities of such anchoring. From the perspective 
of risk it would be better to avoid comparisons at all than to adopt those that are ill-suited to the 
task. As one reflective participant put it, “comparing apples to oranges is not necessarily better 
than comparing apples to nothing.”  
 
Conclusions  
 
This paper has identified five major barriers that development philanthropists must overcome in 
order to properly manage risk in their philanthropy.  
 
Properly defining risk in development philanthropy is of chief importance, as it is different from 
how both traditional decision making theories and for-profit managers define risk (Shapira, 
1994). To our knowledge we are the first to study the domain of development philanthropy and 
delineate impact, operational or assessment risks and how to manage them.  
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Our findings suggest that individuals anchor their risk assessment in philanthropy on their past 
professional and personal experience. In becoming a professional philanthropist they must 
therefore properly overcome the “anchoring and under-adjustment” heuristic and adjust properly 
to the context of each giving decision. Our data have suggested three ways in which this might 
be accomplished; encouraging reflection on the fact that anchors exist, the provision of new 
anchors, and the selection of projects where one’s existing anchors might be more appropriate. In 
the case of the latter solution, individuals can then be encouraged to take risks that are 
progressively outside of their comfort zone. 
 
Donors have the same high sensitivity to probabilities close to “impossibility” and “certainty.” 
However, much of giving focuses on bringing a project with a high probability of success to 
certainty, instead of bringing an otherwise impossible project to a slight chance of success. We 
suggest that greater attention be played to the latter, with nonprofits framing their need to take 
account of individual sensitivity to probability where the value is close to zero.  
 
Individuals are more sensitive to perceived losses than they are to perceived gains. This matters 
since they also expend significantly less cognitive effort in identifying their gains. To take more 
risk philanthropists need to be encouraged to reflect on why their philanthropy is intrinsically 
motivating to them and thus identifying all the gains it delivers.  
 
Individuals should also be persuaded to invest the time necessary to in gain domain specific 
knowledge before participating in philanthropy. They need a fundamental understanding of how 
it might differ from others they have worked in and thus how they can adapt their previous 
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knowledge, competencies and networks to greatest effect. Those taking this time will be better 
equipped to take decisions and perhaps tolerate a higher degree of risk. 
 
There is a similar need to ensure that those new to philanthropy recognize their natural aversion 
to ambiguity. While it will be perfectly natural to seek out anchors to use in reducing that 
ambiguity, in the context of social innovation it will be highly unlikely that appropriate anchors 
will exist. Where that is case it would be better to avoid comparisons completely than to take 
decisions based on inappropriate numbers. 
 
 
Limitations 
 
 
The limitations of a grounded theory approach are well documented (Goulding, 2005). While our 
findings appear to fit well within the extant risk and nonprofit literature, care must be taken in 
attempting to generalize our findings to other risk or philanthropic contexts. Further, perhaps 
quantitative work, would be necessary to test the contributions that we offer to theory above, 
although it must be acknowledged that gaining the requisite access for such a study may prove 
problematic.  
 
Further work would also be helpful to understand how our findings might play out in collective 
decision making contexts such as giving circles (Eikenberry, 2009). It would also be helpful to 
explore how peer groups, support organizations and perhaps educational interventions could be 
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used to overcome the five barriers we delineate (Brown & Kalegaonkar, 2002). Finally, ways 
must be found of integrating a deeper understanding of how individuals conceptualize risk into 
accountability and performance evaluation systems. Such a step would be helpful in encouraging 
a level of risk taking more optimal for both the focal philanthropist and their chosen 
beneficiaries.  
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 RISK PERCEPTION AND MANAGEMENT IN DEVELOPMENT PHILANTHROPY 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The elimination of poverty is the No1 goal outlined in the United Nation’s sustainable 
development agenda 2030 (United Nations 2016). It is also the focus of numerous NGOs and 
charities, as well as development assistance programs from governments (Pratt et al 2006). In its 
broadest sense, poverty is defined as a failure of basic human capability to function in society 
(Nussbaum and Sen, 1993). It could be caused by a complex array of problems such as 
“inadequate income or education, poor health, insecurity, low self-confidence, a sense of 
powerlessness or the absence of rights such as freedom of speech” (World Bank Institute, 2005).  
 
In this paper, we use the phrase international development to describe any effort that is exerted to 
grow human capability to function in society. Economic growth, although an important factor in 
eliminating poverty, does not address poverty elimination in this broader sense (Dollar, et al, 
2013; Dollar and Kraay, 2002).  This paper focuses on unblocking a key barrier that prevents 
many countries from alleviating poverty, namely a “lack of innovation” in the systems that foster 
human wellbeing (Sachs, 2005). We chose this focus because of its importance. In a  study 
spanning two decades which examined differences in attained poverty reduction Sachs (2005, 
p62) concluded that “the innovation gap is certainly one of the most fundamental reasons why … 
Revised Manuscript (showing track changes)
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countries have diverged and why the poorest of the poor have not been able to get a foothold on 
growth.”   
 
It remains unclear though who might be best placed to invest in the requisite level of innovation 
and to accept the risk inherent therein.So how might one foster that innovation?  
 
Government officials in developed countries are often unwilling to take significant risk with 
public money because failure can potentially end or at least stall their careers (Powell & 
Steinberg, 2006). Government officials in impoverished countries do not have sufficient tax 
income in order to invest in innovation. They seek foreign assistance to carry out even the most 
basic governance functions (Pratt et al 2006).  Equally, established international foundations or 
non-profit organizations can find themselves constrained because of their missions, values and 
the risk aversion of key stakeholders (Stauber, 2001; Brown & Kalegaonkar, 2002).  
 
It has also been argued that for-profit inventors cannot adequately address innovation because 
“even if these inventors are able to develop new scientific approaches to meet local economic 
needs, the chances of recouping investments in research and development through latter sales in 
the local market are very low. The local purchasing power to buy a new product is tiny, and will 
not provide for sufficient profits if an innovation is successfully brought to market.” (Sachs, 
2005, p 61) Though there have of course been notable exceptions (see for example, Sargeant 
2010), Dorado (2006)  argues similarly that enterprise can't take the kind of risks necessary to 
bring about systemic change even if it can sometimes lead to small-scale and local innovation.  
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So who might that leave? One of the major conclusions of a Rockefeller Foundation summit held 
in Bellagio in Nov 2011, on The Future of Philanthropy and Development in the Pursuit of 
Human Wellbeing, was that the perception and management of risk in the development “system” 
may be an issue. While there are obviously many relevant development actors, participants felt 
that philanthropy could become more accepting of risk in international development, cognizant 
of what might be a distinctive contribution to the development of long-term eco-system 
sustainability (Bellagio Initiative, 2012). Participants felt that individual philanthropists (in 
particular), could be muchbe more accepting of failure and recognize that to achieve genuine 
change much of their resource may be “wasted” along the way. Failure, participants 
argued, shouldshould be seen as the acceptable cost of innovation (Bellagio Initiative, 2012). 
 
However, there is evidence that many philanthropists are not willing to take risks with their 
philanthropy. The Bank of America and Center on Philanthropy (2012) study tells us that 
virtually no high value philanthropists want to take substantive risks with their philanthropic 
assets (a mere 2.3%). Equally, a previous iteration of the same study tells us that philanthropists 
are actually more risk averse with their philanthropic assets than they are with their personal 
financial assets. Some 26% reported not being willing to take any risks with their philanthropic 
assets, compared with only 10% who took a similar view of their other financial investments 
(Bank of America and Center on Philanthropy, 2010). There is also much anecdotal evidence 
that supports these findings with many sector leaders suggesting that large scale development 
philanthropy has failed and that a greater degree of vision and risk taking is now necessary 
(National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy 2010). Howard Buffet, for example, has 
called on his peers to take more risks and focus on longer-term solutions, although recognizing 
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that not all organizations are equally well placed to do so. In his view “a private family 
foundation is in the best position of anyone to take risks. (They) don’t have to worry about 
making donors happy. (They) don’t have to fund raise,” (cited in Forbes, 2013). 
 
In the study that follows we take no stance on whether individual philanthropists should take 
more risk in their philanthropy per se. Nor do we mean to suggest that encouraging 
philanthropists to take risk is necessarily preferable to risk taking by other actors. Rather we seek 
to understand how individual philanthropists conceptualize and manage risk in their giving with 
the goal of delineating how individuals could engage in more informed decision making and 
arrive at a perspective and an approach that is right for them. 
 
To do this we use a Decoding-the-Discipline approach (Pace and Middledorf, 2004) to reach 
greater clarity on how risk is defined by development philanthropists, the perceived barriers they 
need to overcome in order to anticipate and manage such risks, and how they might be able to 
optimize the value delivered by their risk management practice. We will conclude with further 
insights on how the development sector might help promote and support higher risk-taking in 
individual philanthropy and the circumstances where that might be appropriate. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
We chose to use the Decoding-the-Discipline interview procedures (Middendorf & Pace, 2004) 
guided by the principles of grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) in this research for 
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important pragmatic and epistemological reasons. Pragmatically, our literature review did not 
identify any research on how risk is defined or managed by high value philanthropists. We define 
high value philanthropists as those who have given over $5 million in personal resources to the 
task of (in this case) international development. 
 
While much has been written on the topic of risk in the discipline of psychology (e.g. Slovic 
2010) and business risk management (e.g. Shapira, 1995), surprisingly little research exists on 
how entrepreneurs (with the exception of Koellinger, et al 2007; Kumar, 2013) or social 
entrepreneurs (with the exception of Ellis et al., 2012; Miles et al., 2013; Phillips, 2005) perceive 
or manage risks. The Bank of America and Center on Philanthropy study (2010, 2012) focused 
only on financial risks relying on its common definition, without asking how philanthropists 
define the concept of risk. We thus opted for a “purist” approach in the application of grounded 
theory (Dunne, 2011). That is we did not then conduct an extensive search of the literature on the 
psychology and general management of risk prior to data collection.  
 
Both authors are however aware of the existence of this literature, making it impossible, 
phenomenologically or hermeneutically, “not bring any a priori knowledge” on risk into the 
project (Locke, 1996, p. 242). In that sense, we adopted recursive analytic operations (Locke 
1996) in our application of grounded theory. That is our data collection, analysis and 
interpretations occurred in a recursive cycle where data collection and data analysis occurred 
simultaneously (i.e. constant comparison) and where decisions about which data should be 
collected next were determined by the theory that was being constructed (i.e. theoretical 
sampling) (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1992; Dunne, 2011). The nature of this 
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epistemological approach is important. It means we then permit data to dictate the development 
of our substantive theory (i.e. on risk in international development philanthropy), while at the 
same time we allow existing theoretical concepts (i.e. general psychology and management of 
risk) to earn their way into our “narrative” (Dunne, 2011). In this sense existing theory is 
analyzed as an additional informant and we treat it as such below by presenting extant thinking 
alongside our data (Glaser, 1978).   
We conducted a series of twenty 60-90 minute telephone interviews with high value 
philanthropists drawn from Africa, Asia, Europe and North/South America. Initial participants 
were recommended for their expertise in managing philanthropic risk by the funders of the study 
(the Rockefeller Foundation and the Resource Alliance). Only two informants had attended the 
Bellagio summit, the goal being to canvas as wide a spectrum of opinion as possible. Additional 
informants were sought as the project unfolded. Each philanthropist had devoted personal wealth 
in excess of $5million to the task of international development. The sample comprised a mix of 
different ages (40-80) and genders (10 male and 10 female). It also includes individuals with 
first, second or third generation wealth. Some of them made their own wealth, while others 
inherited it.  These individuals were giving through a variety of mechanisms, but primarily 
through Private and Family Foundations and Venture Philanthropy. Each interview was digitally 
recorded, transcribed and subject to a review based on grounded analysis.  
In structuring the interviews a Decoding-the Discipline (DtD) approach was adopted. Althaus 
(2005) argued that research on risk could benefit from a “disciplinary perspective.” DtD is a 
pedagogical research tool originally designed to help instructors aid students overcome 
“bottlenecks” in order to think like a disciplinary expert (Middendorf & Pace, 2004). The DtD 
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approach assumes that people, who are experts in their field, become experts because they are 
extremely good at what they do. One consequence of being extremely good, however, is that the 
thinking process that they use to become an expert becomes so natural to them that they rarely 
need to think about how they do things or reflect on the major barriers that they need to 
overcome in order accomplish something. It becomes second nature to them, making it difficult 
to isolate learning that might aid others to cope in similar scenarios. DtD is thus suited to 
scenarios where it is necessary to uncover or decode expert ways of thinking that are not 
intuitively obvious, even to the informant.  
In this approach, the interviewer focuses on barriers or “bottlenecks” that experts need to 
overcome in order to achieve a goal. We therefore asked our interviewees to “recall an 
experience where they deliberately took a higher than normal level of risk or where they had to 
cope with a difficult consequence of having taken a risky decision.” Then, the interview focused 
on teasing out the steps that such individuals go through in taking these decisions. Interviewers 
continued to probe until the subject would typically conclude that “I cannot tell you what I 
thought about, I just did it.” The interviewer then encourages respondents to reflect on additional 
memory cues (e.g. how they were feeling at that moment, who they were with, what they might 
recall about the surroundings) to stimulate a deeper level of reflection and allow participants to 
truly deconstruct their thinking processes and reformulate how they approached each dimension 
of the focal decision (Díaz et al.. 2008).  
 
Following Glaser (2001) interviews continued to the point where no new learning was accruing. 
At this point a concept has been theoretically saturated. There are differing perspectives on the 
minimum number of interviews that might be deemed sufficient for this saturation to occur (e.g. 
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Bruce 2007; Guest et al 2006) but we allowed the final size of the sample to be dictated by our 
data. In this respect we follow Francis et al (2010) who propose a “10+3” formula to establish 
data saturation. Specifically, at least ten interviews are to be conducted followed by a further 
three to evaluate if any new insights are being produced. This rolling, “last three sample” is 
conducted after each successive interview after the tenth. Two assessors were involved in this 
evaluation. 
 
 
Results 
 
In the course of our interviews we delineated five barriers that our informants needed to 
overcome in order to clearly define what risk means and how to manage it, such that they may 
take the “right” kind and the “right” severity of risks in order to create impact in caring for their 
beneficiaries. The DtD approach dictates that we took people back to the experience where they 
experienced the most difficulty or highest level of arousal in managing their risks and then traced 
the progression of their experience chronologically. It is hence possible that the seemingly 
logical steps that we identified in this paper are due in part to the method of posing 
chronologically sequenced questions.  
 
It is also important to note though that in mapping out barriers below, that the process was not 
always experienced in a linear fashion and not all barriers were experienced by all participants. It 
was also clear that people do not go through the five barriers only once; they sometimes needed 
to iterate different steps and in different orders. Thus while we are cognizant of the possible 
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weaknesses in our approach we do not believe the categories below are a function of our 
methodology. They could be raised multiple times in a conversation and in different sequences.  
 
 
Throughout our discussion and in the discussion of the fifth barrier in particular, we will describe 
the iterative and integrated nature of how our interviewees overcame these barriers. We will 
conclude with a brief summary of how these findings can be used to design interventions to 
support risk optimization in individual philanthropy. 
 
Barrier 1: Defining What Risk Means  
 
The primary risk in international development philanthropy was felt to be the risk of not 
achieving the desired impact for the focal beneficiary group. This is what we shall refer to 
hereafter as Impact Risk. It is composed by both a sense of ambiguity and a sense of uncertainty 
(Einhorn & Hogarth, 1985). It is important to understand that this definition implies that the 
articulation of impact risk is subjective and personal to a philanthropist. This is consistent with 
previous conceptualizations (e.g. Slovic, 2010) but our research describes more precisely the 
nature of how international development philanthropists subjectively define their risks.   
 
First, it is often difficult for philanthropists to articulate how they define impact (thus creating 
uncertainty) and in many cases their definitions morphed substantively as they learned more 
about what was necessary in a given context. One of our philanthropists, for example, originally 
defined her impact as managing the pain of terminally ill children in the focal community. This 
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later morphed into successfully caring for the parents, family and community who suffer 
alongside the children, and then ultimately to transforming the education of medical doctors in 
the country such that palliative care could become a routinely considered option.  
 
Second, it is often difficult for philanthropists to decide a priori how to design an effective social 
innovation system (i.e. selection of appropriate intervention(s) and the design of an appropriate 
system for delivery) to achieve the desired impact (Liedtka & Ogilvie, 2010). This design too 
might need to morph as the program proceeds, often creating further and frequently, heightened 
uncertainty. This is what we term Operational Risk. High operational risk in international 
development philanthropy is caused primarily by the degree of innovation in the design of the 
intervention itself. Consistent with previous literature, the more philanthropists rely on pre-tested 
ideas and avenues commonly agreed to be effective, the lower the perceived risk (Murrey, 2010). 
 
Returning to our previous example, in seeking to reduce the pain experienced by terminally ill 
children our philanthropist perceived relatively little operational risk when the impact she 
conceptualized was merely the provision of palliative medicines (a simple matter of distribution). 
This morphed over time into finding innovative ways to influence the established perspective on 
medical ethics in the country where resulting to palliative care was regarded as an admission of 
failure and therefore rarely offered. 
 
Finally, the lack of evidence or the provision of tangential or partial evidence in support of the 
success of an initiative can also create a source of risk. This includes the selection of relevant 
metrics, the data gathered and their interpretation. This is what we term Assessment Risk and 
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the construction of the right assessment approach may also need to morph as the program 
proceeds. Assessment is where most nonprofit risk literature focuses (Paarlberg & Meinhold, 
2012; Thomson, 2010), however, most of this extant work focuses on the reporting of established 
organizations (rather than start-ups) and fails to address the relationship with the other categories 
of risk we delineate (Lee et al., 2010).  
 
Our philanthropist was initially very confident that she knew what to measure and how to 
measure it (i.e. counting the number of children aided.) “When we started out, I was running it 
like an investment bank. There were targets to be met, and the targets were basically 
established by me.” As the project progressed the identification of appropriate metrics became 
increasingly problematic. It transpired that the medical profession was highly resistant to change 
and that the only way to influence the profession was through the opinions and actions of the 
nurses caring for the patients and their families. As the nature of the intervention morphed, so the 
search for appropriate assessment measures morphed and this in turn (ultimately) helped shape 
her conceptualization of her impact risk. “We realized we could not focus on doctors and the 
actions of doctors because that was ineffectual. Rather we had to focus on other influencers in 
the caregiving process.” 
 
Considered together (see Table 1) our research therefore reveals a complicated picture of how 
international development philanthropists define risks: three discrete categories of risk, but with 
the ambiguity and uncertainty in each capable of generating further ambiguity and uncertainty in 
others (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1985).  
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Insert Table 1 near here. 
 
Other risks concerning philanthropists engaged in international development include financial 
risks, reputational risks, political risks and personal risks. These other risks however were never 
described as the “core,” “fundamental,” or “most important,” risks that troubled them. In the 
majority of our cases, these other types of risks concerned philanthropists because they increased 
their impact or operational risk. The reduction of these other risks was never mentioned as an 
end in itself. Our cases did not contain reference to any other risks.  
 
Barrier 2: Determining What Degree of Risk is Acceptable  
 
Slovic (2000, pxxxvi) concluded after 50 years of research on risk perception that "there is no 
such thing as … objective risk." "Risk (similar to organizational effectiveness) is inherently 
subjective" and a function of many different variables, notably the background, personality and 
experiences of the individual (eg Sung & Hanna, 1996; Grable & Lytton, 1998). Risk takers, in 
the broader population, are “psychologically flexible”, better educated, have a high tolerance for 
ambiguity, a past record of successful risk taking and respond rapidly to stimuli (Trimpop, 
1994). Indeed, several studies have found that up to a quarter of the variation in risk taking by 
individuals can be explained by personality variables (Coleman, 2007).  
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People also take decisions in part about the risk they are prepared to tolerate by drawing on other 
life experiences, even if these are drawn from other contexts where the circumstances and rules 
of the game are very different. They also tend to over-emphasize conclusions drawn from recent 
experiences (Zackay, 1984) and place more emphasis on the consequences of decision outcomes 
than on their statistical probabilities (Forlani, 2002).  
 
One widely studied decision making heuristic appears to influence most aspects of how 
philanthropists assess risk. The heuristic we are referring to is termed anchoring. Kahneman and 
Tversky (1974) found that people often make numerical judgments by anchoring on a number 
and then adjusting for other things that they know. But on average, people under-adjust. In 
philanthropy what was identified in our study, was that this heuristic can be helpful or harmful to 
risk assessment depending on the nature of such anchors, the specific context of the 
philanthropic decision making and the extent to which the individual appropriately adjusts. From 
our discussions, for example, it was clear that many of our participants had used anchors drawn 
from their experience in business and the public sector and thus, as it turned out (Epley & 
Gilovich, 2005), anchors that were inappropriate to the practice of philanthropy.  
 
So how does this happen? The first task that philanthropists appeared to face when making 
decisions about how much risk to take in a given philanthropic engagement was to determine the 
magnitude of both impact and to a lesser extent financial risks. In respect of impact risks, our 
philanthropists tended to term the following types of projects high-risk projects; circumstances 
where: 
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a) Outcomes are hard to measure 
b) Accurate measurements are hard to obtain 
c) Positive measurements may only show up in a long-term time horizon. 
d) Outcome measures are not endorsed homogeneously by all relevant parties. 
 
In respect of financial risk they consider the following factors in determining the level of risk: 
 
a) How risk-diverse is their philanthropic portfolio 
b) Where does a particular philanthropic investment lie in their philanthropic profile 
c) How big is a particular philanthropic investment? 
 
There are echoes of these points in the wider business risk and judgment and decision making 
literature where it is well established that the more ambiguous the probability of success is, the 
less likely one is to perceive such endeavors as risky, the more risk-diversified one’s portfolio is, 
the more likely one is to tolerate risk and the larger a particular investment is, the higher the risk 
it is perceived to carry (Slovic, 2000). Our research identifies that these are the critical factors in 
the domain of philanthropy. 
 
We also gain new insight through combining knowledge of anchoring and under-adjustment with 
context specific knowledge about how philanthropists define impact and operational risk. We 
can thus begin to answer questions such as how “hard” is hard, how “long” is long, how 
“diverse” is comfortably diverse, and how “big” is too big?  
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We found that philanthropists use their own previous experience to anchor their judgment about 
philanthropic risks, and they do so along the dimensions we mention above. For example, for 
someone who has been engaged in the world of venture capital in medical research, they will be 
used to making large investments over significant time horizons where the outcomes may not be 
known for many years and where the side effects of any new drugs may be hard to quantify. The 
likely outcomes from their philanthropy may be similarly hard to quantify, and they thus see the 
impact risk as moderate, but if the size of the investment is significantly smaller and the time 
horizon shorter than they are used to, they will be inclined to see less financial risk in their 
giving. 
 
What this means is that they weight their risk assessment more heavily on their past experience 
than they should and take less account of the “real” risk in the context of their philanthropic 
decisions. For example, for a Venture Capital professional, when he decides to become a 
philanthropist, he may engage in “unnecessarily” high risk philanthropy, simply because he is 
used to high risk, while an industrialist may engage in “unnecessarily” low risk philanthropy, 
because she is not comfortable with higher degrees of risk. From this perspective, past 
professional experience might become a foe not a friend in determining the optimal risk to take 
in their philanthropy (see also Zackay, 1984). 
 
To encourage individuals to improve their philanthropic decision making they have to be 
encouraged to set aside value judgements and their associated anchors from their prior 
experience (in business) and to consider philanthropic decisions afresh. Hermansson (2012), for 
example, argues that “even though every ‘objective’ risk can be described in several different 
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ways, and does involve value judgements and emotions, the (search for) objectivity ideal should 
not be abandoned.” (Hermansson, 2012, p.16)  Thus if an individual wishes to become a full time 
philanthropist a process of education must take place. Individuals need to be given new anchor 
points appropriate to the sector they will now be working in, perhaps through the establishment 
of networks that allow philanthropists and development professions to share experiences and 
communicate new norms.  
 
“Just being in philanthropy itself (isn’t enough). You have to have the field 
expertise, right, so I may be concerned about reducing nuclear weapons, but you 
know, I need then to go to people who spend their lives understanding 
possibilities for reducing nuclear proliferation. I think people think that once 
they’re in the role of philanthropy, they’re in. Good intentions won’t do it. They 
forget that it calls for expertise.” 
 
“All six of us (in the same giving circle) come from business and cooperate 
background and tended to apply that business logic. “Why should we be doing 
this?” And some times during the process we needed one of us to step back and 
say, “This is crazy”. We are here to give away our money… we should allow 
ourselves to take a much greater amount of risk and take a vow to give away this 
money rather than be protective….” 
 
An alternative approach would be to encourage philanthropists to engage in a greater degree of 
reflection. The goal here isn’t to change the anchor, rather to ensure that the individual adjusts 
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correctly. Individuals need to be helped to realize how their (sometimes irrelevant) past 
experience influences their risk assessment in philanthropy, so they may adjust properly and 
arrive at a more mature assessment of the risk at hand. 
 
“Let’s say that their spouse or child gets cancer. Giving can be a personal 
reaction. They just don’t think any further on it. They are just giving to the cause 
because of a person or connection. And somewhere along the way they start 
asking questions about what the organization is doing and then they get a bit 
appalled (because of their business expectations). Then they might be more 
discriminating about their giving. Then when they get to my stage they start to 
realize that each organization they are giving to is a distinct philanthropic gift as 
opposed to a commercial investment. So I think it is a learning curve that we all 
have to go through.” 
 
A third potential approach would to be help philanthropists identify projects that have a better fit 
with the levels of risk they are comfortably used to taking. Philanthropists can match themselves 
to the right causes, or the right causes can seek out the right philanthropists. The individual can 
then be encouraged to take rational small steps out of their comfort zone. The idea is presented 
graphically in Figure 1. 
 
If a philanthropist is comfortable with accurately adjusted risk assessment at level 1, in order for 
her to take up additional risk, the best way to encourage that is to find a project that is at level 2 
and move her up the scale. She would be uncomfortable and may even refuse to invest directly in 
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projects perceived as level 5 yet lower levels may be acceptable. Individuals from different 
professional backgrounds will be more or less risk tolerant and thus arrive at a different level in 
the model. 
 
 
Insert Figure 1 Near Here 
 
 
Barrier 3: How to Decide When to Shift Mindset 
 
 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) found that when individuals are deciding whether or not to take a 
risk they are most sensitive to changes in probability near the natural boundaries of 0 
(impossible) and 1 (certain). Thus, a 0.1 increase in the probability of making a social impact has 
a greater impact on decisions when it changes the probability of making an impact from zero to 
0.1 (from impossibility to a slight chance of making an impact) or from achieving a definite 
impact to a slight chance of something going wrong (i.e. from 1.0 to 0.9). Consider the following 
philanthropic examples. In our first scenario a philanthropist believes there is a 70% chance of an 
organization achieving a social impact without their help and an 80% chance if she offers it. She 
will be much less likely to offer her support than in a second scenario where there is a 10% 
chance of success with her help and none without it.  
 
Our interviewees felt that many new philanthropists were taking decisions in the realm of 0.9 to 
1.0 where with the proper metrics they could approach certainty in respect of the outcome they 
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desired to achieve. At the same time, there would also seem to be an opportunity to focus on the 
other end of the scale, where there is zero probability of achieving a social impact without a 
philanthropist’s involvement. Theory predicts that philanthropists will be as likely to engage in 
this latter scenario, so the issue for innovation projects becomes one of framing.  
 
To illustrate - one of our interviewees explained that each and every one of his program ideas 
had been tried by other organizations before and met with failure. What attracted him was the 
ability to combine these ideas and have them tackled by a single entity. In aggregate the risk was 
therefore very substantial, but he believed that a multi-faceted approach had a “slim” chance of 
working. He was in a unique position to be able to try that approach and thus create something 
from nothing. That is what ultimately drew him to the project. Kahneman and Tversky explain 
this behavior and suggest that this philanthropist would have been less likely to invest if the 
previous interventions by other organizations had been met with mixed success. 
 
A number of our philanthropists elected to “balance” their giving by selecting some projects 
which approached certainty in their likelihood of success (and thus seen as “low hanging fruit”), 
but adding project(s) where the probability of success is close to zero, but where the potential 
gains are highly desirable. They thus adopted a portfolio perspective, consistent with general risk 
theories.  
 
Our interviews suggested a further option, namely focusing on the role of the individual 
philanthropist, rather than the project per se. There are many scenarios where the project will 
only have impact if a particular philanthropist gets involved. If a nonprofit can make it clear that 
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there is a close to zero chance of the project happening without ONLY this one individual’s 
support they can increase the likelihood of giving. Our data indicated that it was not enough for 
this matching to be superficial. Many individuals might be able to offer the focal amount or share 
a genuine passion for the cause. The notion of a match only became believable when distinctive 
knowledge and competences were sought.  Figure 2 illustrates the idea. 
 
Insert Figure 2 Near Here 
 
It may be rare that a philanthropist would be willing to immerse themselves in a project and 
provide all the elements we list in the box, but it was clear from our interviews that some 
combination of the talent they bring to the table may on occasion be distinct. What interests us 
this approach is that while such a tailored ask would be likely to increase the chances of support, 
it will also enhance the giving experience for the philanthropist (Bellagio Initiative, 2012). 
 
There are also take-outs from Kahneman and Tversky’s work for individual philanthropists who 
can benefit from being aware of how their assessments of risk are framed. They too can seek 
better matches between their philanthropy and competences to achieve impact or identify 
personal development issues that might need to be addressed to get them to that point. They can 
also be cognizant of a natural tendency towards short-term gratification (Angeletos et al., 2001) 
rather than longer-term projects that might better serve both their needs and the needs of the 
community. As the quality of the individual fit improves, they should become more accepting of 
risk. As an example, one philanthropist wanted to donate some money to a charity that had  
“touched his heart”, but he never heard back from the organization with their bank details. He 
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concluded that “we could add a lot more value for them if we helped with their fundraising 
and donor management effort. Because we didn't think that they had that at all.” So they then 
developed a program to help train nonprofit staff on fundraising management.  
 
Barrier 4: Coping With Negative Emotion 
 
Many of our informants reported a high degree of frustration with their early forays into the 
domain of philanthropy. They experienced frustration if success was not as forthcoming as they 
hoped and after successive “failures” were encountered, some of those we interviewed had 
actively considered withdrawing from the domain. As one individual commented “there just 
didn’t seem to be the personal rewards I had hoped for.”  In this section we explore the source of 
that negative emotion and how reframing the issues might prove helpful. 
 
In a philanthropic transaction, an amount of money is transferred from a philanthropist’s account 
direct to another’s account. There is nothing intrinsic to this transfer that is either a gain or a loss, 
so a philanthropist could view it as either. This transfer might be perceived as a gain when social 
impact is anticipated or achieved; and as a loss when an undesired social impact is created or a 
desired social impact is created unsustainably, or not at all. In this sense, the valuation of money 
is never a stand-alone valuation in the philanthropic context. The valuation of any financial input 
is always associated with the valuation of the achievement or anticipated sustainable 
achievement of the social impact. One reflected that “look, we are going to give this money 
away anyway but this is a better way of applying our philanthropic dollars. We don’t need any 
financial return but we do want to see the social and environmental return.” 
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To encourage successful risk assessment and management, our philanthropists explicitly 
articulated what would constitute gains and losses in terms of their resources. These resources 
may include financial, time and/or network resources. An explicit consideration of these issues 
has the potential to greatly enhance decision making since the philanthropists in our sample were 
typically 1) very good at articulating potential loses or gains for their beneficiaries, but not for 
themselves and 2) very good at articulating potential losses, but not as good at articulating all the 
potential gains. 
 
In evaluating philanthropic impact, our philanthropists consciously considered social impact as a 
gain, and the nature of this gain is what concerns them most in their philanthropic involvement. 
Since this is the type of gain that they consider central to their philanthropic investment, they 
were almost always focused on refining it until when they could articulate it clearly. They 
acknowledged that this articulation may not have been clear at the inception of a project, but it 
was nevertheless something that they had made a conscious effort to do. One of our informants 
reflected that “for me I was always very strict. “Why don’t we have the results? Why don’t they 
want high marks? Is that the right impact …?” 
 
What was less obvious to some philanthropists was that personal impact (i.e. impact on them as 
an individual) can also be a gain.  Most participants felt that personal gain was not why they 
entered philanthropy and they stopped their reflection at that point without necessarily asking 
themselves what consequence their philanthropy might bring to them. As selfish as this reflection 
might seem, our interviews revealed that those who had considered personal gains found much 
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more depth and personal value in their philanthropy, typically reflecting on the meaning of their 
life as articulated through their giving, the intellectual stimulation of trying to solve difficult and 
often intractable social problems, and/or the sustained enjoyment derived from developing their 
competence to contribute to social change (consistent with recommendations of economist, 
Andreoni, 1990).  
 
“I am really good at problem solving. A lot of social problems are really difficult 
to solve, and no one has been able to solve them before. My philanthropy offers 
me the opportunity to stretch my problem-solving skills to a place where they 
have never been stretched before, and that is exciting and fun.”  
 
Indeed there is evidence in the extant literature that “successful risk taking individuals are likely 
to believe that they can beat the odds …and that they have special abilities” (West & Berthon, 
1997, p.30). Thus being given the opportunity to reinforce that identity can be a significant 
personal gain. Here, our philanthropists actually experience “more excitement and fun” in 
solving social problems, then solving problems in their business careers such as investment 
banking. This is because for them, “the social sector is maybe more challenging … in many 
aspects than the private sector. It is no less rewarding, meaningful, fulfilling; in fact probably 
more so than working in the private sector.”  
 
As obvious as this might sound, we found that if philanthropists did not focus consciously on 
what their giving achieved for them, their potential losses can begin to outweigh their gains. As a 
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consequence they can experience negative emotions and they are less likely to be accepting of 
development risk.  
 
 
 
 
Barrier 5: How to Decide What to Transfer from Their Life Experience to Their 
Philanthropy 
 
 
In comparison to the previous four barriers, this barrier would not in itself make-or-break one’s 
philanthropy. It is simply a learning journey that our interviewees consciously monitored and 
improved with time and experience. However, failing to overcome this last barrier simultaneous 
with overcoming the others could increase the perceived severity of the first four barriers and 
harm one’s overall risk-appetite for philanthropy.  
 
Many participants in our study felt that one of the most important lessons they had learned on 
their philanthropic journey was the importance of gaining domain specific knowledge of the 
social problems they targeted and the need to gain higher competence in solving these problems. 
This higher competence could be derived from their experience in philanthropy, but it would 
more typically derive from understanding how to leverage their existing (perhaps business 
acquired) competences to tackle the social problem. That is to leverage the same general thinking 
skills but properly adjust to the right anchors in their thinking frameworks.  
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During the initial learning stage, when the development problems are not smoothly gelled with 
their existing competence, they experience a challenge to their sense of self-efficacy and as we 
noted above can become disheartened with the reality of how difficult it is to create and sustain 
social change. For some of our participants, early in their philanthropic ‘careers’ this feeling of 
powerlessness had led to a growing desire to terminate their philanthropic involvement. Erecting 
a “reflection buffer” before transferring other life experiences to their philanthropic domain 
might therefore be valuable. 
 
One example of a transfer that may or may not be helpful is an individual’s decision making 
rules. As one informant told us “When I make a business investment, I am concerned about the 
maximization of financial returns in my investment. But when I make a philanthropic investment, 
all that I care about is that the nonprofit organization can make ends meet while achieving its 
goals.” So in the philanthropic context they do not maximize financial returns, but instead seek 
what our informant referred to as a kind of  “break-even” point such that the cause they care 
about may be sustainable. There was broad agreement that philanthropy was different in this 
way, yet what seemed more problematic for our interviewees was unpacking the notion of what 
it meant to ‘break-even’ and thus what might constitute an appropriate level of investment and its 
associated level of risk. This struggle associated with defining operational risk is made more 
severe when one’s impact risk is not well defined, and thus no decision rules may be properly 
evaluated.  
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Our data show that the position is further complicated by the notion that there appeared to be 
different criteria applied when asking the question “why should I invest?” from “why shouldn’t I 
invest?” One participant told us that “I worked hard to earn my income, so I do not want it to be 
wasted,” but in the course of the conversation it became apparent that the avoidance of waste 
was rarely considered as a key criteria for saying yes to a project. Rather this appeared to be a 
major criterion in saying no. This was a theme repeated consistently in our interviews; 
philanthropists seemed to have two distinct sets of criteria. This dichotomy matters for two 
reasons; firstly that Kahneman and Tversky (1979) tell us that philanthropists will pay a 
disproportionate amount of attention to the negative list and secondly, the negative list is often 
comprised of factors associated with a high degree of ambiguity e.g. what constitutes “waste”? 
 
The judgment about what constitutes “waste” may again be determined through the principle of 
anchoring, but the difficulty for those new to philanthropy is that they frequently have nothing to 
anchor to as nonprofits operate in a different way to either businesses or the public sector. 
Administration costs, for example, were frequently mentioned as a cause for concern, yet 
administration in the nonprofit context is inherently more complex than in business, making it 
inappropriate to anchor to that context. The reasons for this complexity are well documented 
(Murray, 2010)., but include: 
 
(1) nonprofits have very diverse stakeholders and must build and maintain relationships with 
all/most of them;  
(2) ownership is often diffuse and there is therefore no clear priority among the stakeholders;  
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(3) nonprofits have more diverse sources of revenues than private businesses with each source 
requiring different management skills and strategies;  
(4) nonprofits adopt participatory methodologies and tools. Many organizations are democratic 
and inclusive, being driven by the often conflicting voices of their membership. 
 
Individuals new to philanthropy are thus ill placed to take decisions on what constitutes 
management “waste” or “inefficiency” as their business or public sector anchors no longer apply. 
We therefore recommend that philanthropists be encouraged to consciously reflect on what they 
are anchoring against and the hidden incompatibilities of such anchoring. From the perspective 
of risk it would be better to avoid comparisons at all than to adopt those that are ill-suited to the 
task. As one reflective participant put it, “comparing apples to oranges is not necessarily better 
than comparing apples to nothing.”  
 
Conclusions  
 
This paper has identified five major barriers that development philanthropists must overcome in 
order to properly manage risk in their philanthropy. To facilitate our discussion we have 
organized our paper in the logical order in which a philanthropist might encounter them but we 
do not mean to imply that the process is in any sense linear. As we noted earlier they can be met 
multiple times and in different iterations during an individual’s experience of attempting to solve 
a focal problem.   
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Properly defining risk in development philanthropy is of chief importance, as it is different from 
how both traditional decision making theories and for-profit managers define risk (Shapira, 
1994). Traditional decision theories have defined risks as “the variance of the probability 
distribution of outcomes.” (Shapira, 1995, p. 43), while Shapira concludes that for-profit 
managers “show very little inclination to equate the risk of an alternative with the variance of the 
probability distribution of outcomes that might follow its choice.” To our knowledge we are the 
first to study the domain of development philanthropy and delineate impact, operational or 
assessment risks and how to manage them.  
 
Our findings suggest that individuals anchor their risk assessment in philanthropy on their past 
professional and personal experience. In becoming a professional philanthropist or grantmaker, 
they must therefore properly overcome the “anchoring and under-adjustment” heuristic and 
adjust properly to the context of each giving decision. Our data have suggested three ways in 
which this might be accomplished; encouraging reflection on the fact that anchors exist, the 
provision of new anchors, and the selection of projects where one’s existing anchors might be 
more appropriate. In the case of the latter solution, individuals can then be encouraged to take 
risks that are progressively outside of their comfort zone. 
 
Donors have the same high sensitivity to probabilities close to “impossibility” and “certainty.” 
However, much of giving focuses on bringing a project with a high probability of success to 
certainty, instead of bringing an otherwise impossible project to a slight chance of success. We 
suggest that greater attention be played to the latter, with nonprofits framing their need to take 
account of individual sensitivity to probability where the value is close to zero. Emphasizing the 
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unique contribution that a specific individual might make and tailoring the approach would 
increase risk taking. 
 
Individuals are more sensitive to perceived losses than they are to perceived gains. This matters 
since they also expend significantly less cognitive effort in identifying their gains. To take more 
risk philanthropists need to be encouraged to reflect on why their philanthropy is intrinsically 
motivating to them and thus identifying all the gains it delivers.  
 
Individuals should also be persuaded to invest the time necessary to in gain domain specific 
knowledge before participating in philanthropy. They need a fundamental understanding of how 
it might differ from others they have worked in and thus how they can adapt their previous 
knowledge, competencies and networks to greatest effect. Those taking this time will be better 
equipped to take decisions and perhaps tolerate a higher degree of risk. 
 
There is a similar need to ensure that those new to philanthropy recognize their natural aversion 
to ambiguity. While it will be perfectly natural to seek out anchors to use in reducing that 
ambiguity, in the context of social innovation it will be highly unlikely that appropriate anchors 
will exist. Where that is case it would be better to avoid comparisons completely than to take 
decisions based on inappropriate numbers. 
 
 
Limitations 
 
 30 
 
The limitations of a grounded theory approach are well documented (Goulding, 2005). While our 
findings appear to fit well within the extant risk and nonprofit literature, care must be taken in 
attempting to generalize our findings to other risk or philanthropic contexts. We also 
acknowledge that our sample was small and while care was taken to ensure as diverse a group 
were interviewed as possible and that the conditions for theoretical sampling were met, it is 
possible that our group of informants were atypical. Further, perhaps quantitative work, would be 
necessary to test the contributions that we offer to theory above, although it must be 
acknowledged that gaining the requisite access for such a study may prove problematic.  
 
Further work would also be helpful to understand how our findings might play out in collective 
decision making contexts such as giving circles (Eikenberry, 2009). It would also be helpful to 
explore how peer groups, support organizations and perhaps educational interventions could be 
used to overcome the five barriers we delineate (Brown & Kalegaonkar, 2002). Finally, ways 
must be found of integrating a deeper understanding of how individuals conceptualize risk into 
accountability and performance evaluation systems. Such a step would be helpful in encouraging 
a level of risk taking more optimal for both the focal philanthropist and their chosen 
beneficiaries.  
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Figure 1: An Incremental Approach to the Acceptance of Risk. 
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Figure 2: ONLY you can help 
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1) A target amount      No 
2) A passion for a cause     No 
3) A valuable set of social connections   Maybe 
4) A contextualized understanding of the impact  Maybe 
5) A set of skills, knowledge and competences relevant  
to achieving impact                                                           Maybe 
6) A set of skills, knowledge and competences relevant  
to reducing operational risk    Yes 
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Table 1: Definitions of Risk 
Risk Definition 
Impact Risk The risk of not achieving the desired impact 
for the focal beneficiary group 
Operational Risk The risk of not designing the optimal 
approach, program or mechanism for 
achieving the desired impact 
Assessment Risk The risk of not selecting the right data to 
measure performance, or misinterpreting the 
evidence provided by such data 
Financial Risk The risk for the philanthropist that the 
project will not deliver the magnitude of 
impact anticipated relative to the invested 
resource 
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